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Abstract: Downside risk, which refers to deviations below a threshold, is often important in1
water management decisions, especially in areas with large and skewed variations in precip-2
itation patterns. In this paper, we present a model for a reservoir manager who is downside3
risk averse and who performs a dynamic allocation of irrigation water, taking into account4
the negative effects of droughts on farm profits and different environmental constraints. We5
analyse the water stock, flows, and agricultural profits for alternative environmental restric-6
tions and thresholds for irrigation levels and find that stricter environmental constraints7
increase total water supply and carryover stock, while higher penalty thresholds tend to8
lead to their overall decrease. Furthermore, increasing penalty thresholds leads to a higher9
emphasis on avoiding shortages, at the expense of lower average profits.10
1 Introduction11
The natural variability of available freshwater resources is significant in many areas,12
with large deviations in seasonal and inter-annual precipitation patterns that often bring13
about serious problems for water users (which means, basically, for everyone). In arid and14
semi-arid places with established human populations, the most challenging issue is dealing15
with water scarcity and droughts, which represent the downside of natural variability in16
such areas. Wada et al. (2011) and Rodell et al. (2018) provide global assessments of water17
stress and freshwater availability trends, respectively, highlighting that population growth18
has heightened pressures on what is essentially a finite resource. Moreover, climate change19
is expected to decrease supply and exacerbate demand increases in several regions, through20
lower precipitation and higher temperature, while also bringing additional hydrological vari-21
ability (Schewe et al., 2014). In these circumstances, the importance of including suitable22
risk analyses in water management decisions cannot be overstated.23
Agriculture features prominently in water risk-management literature for two reasons.24
First, it is one of the main water users in many areas, often accounting for the majority of25
2
water withdrawals (in many countries, withdrawals for agriculture are around three quarters26
of the total).1 Also, the sector is fraught with numerous sources of risk, including weather27
conditions as one of the most significant (Zhang and Antle, 2018). Thus the issue of risk28
management in agriculture has received considerable attention for decades (Just, 1975; Hazell29
and Scandizzo, 1977; Binswanger, 1982). A useful summary of the literature is OECD30
(2009). Nonetheless, Just (2003) identifies a need to refocus the analysis by emphasizing31
that farm-level and long-term risks are more relevant, and that methodological approaches32
that stipulate risk neutrality are inappropriate given the empirical evidence, which mostly33
favors the idea that farmers are risk averse. This is pointed out in the survey by Moschini and34
Hennessy (2001), which uses the expected-utility framework. More recently, a few studies35
have used questionnaires to provide a richer characterization of farmer attitudes using the36
theory of planned behaviour (Lynne, 1995; Bergevoet et al., 2004; Läpple and Kelley, 2013;37
Poppenborg and Koellner, 2013).38
In this paper, we focus on the optimal water management problem of a benevolent sup-39
plier, who aims to maximize agricultural profits in a stochastic dynamic problem while40
recognizing downside risk (not enough irrigation may have severe effects below a certain41
threshold). Furthermore, the optimal management problem takes into account environmen-42
tal constraints, such as set minimum levels of water that must be maintained in the reservoir.43
Using data from Turkey, we solve this model computationally to obtain the optimal carry-44
over stock (savings) and irrigation use, and then simulate the model to evaluate the effects45
of these threshold levels and environmental constraints on the key variables.46
In many countries, such as Turkey, where our dataset is from, a benevolent agency is47
in charge of managing reservoirs. If a reservoir supplies water for many uses, decisions in48
case of shortages commonly resort to a prorating strategy . Urban (residential) use is often49
prioritized, which implies other uses such as agriculture may be prorated, depending on the50
severity of the shortage in a particular period. However, this strategy does not take into51
1See FAO AQUASTAT.
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account the dynamic nature of the problem or downside risk. Severe water shortfalls could52
have devastating results on the crop production, via either more land being left fallow or53
lower quality crops. Our model can provide some insight on how a manager may handle54
current shortages with an optimal allocation rule that avoids very undesirable outcomes55
over time.56
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we analyze the effects of downside57
risk on reservoir manager’s decisions. In the relevant literature, Antle (1987) shows that the58
degree of downside risk aversion can be estimated and provides evidence for its occurrence59
among rice farmers in central India. Groom et al. (2008) confirm downside risk aversion60
in Cypriot farmers, highlighting that policy makers who misread farmers’ risk preferences61
may obtain wrong predictions for the magnitude and even direction of input responses to62
water-use restrictions. Antle (2010) defends the use of lower partial moments to estimate63
asymmetric effects of inputs on agricultural production, a strategy pursued by Kim et al.64
(2014), where it can be seen that 90 % of the cost of risk on Korean rice farms comes65
from exposure to downside risk. Bozzola (2014) provides further evidence for downside risk66
aversion in Italian irrigation, noting that it is a key determinant in the decision to adopt67
new technology. Finally, Nauges et al. (2015) point out that different farmer groups seem to68
hold different attitudes to risk, with horticultural irrigators showing downside risk aversion.69
In our paper, we analyze the effects of setting different thresholds on the irrigation water70
use and agricultural profits over time, via changes in the mean as well as the shape of the71
distribution.72
Second, we incorporate the lower partial moments (LPMs) into the stochastic problem73
to analyze the effects of downside risk over time. We assume that the manager allocates74
water under uncertainty across user groups while avoiding very low outcomes. The litera-75
ture covers a number of instruments that target risk reduction, including efficient distribu-76
tion (i.e., water-trading options and environmental-insurance contracts), increasing supply77
(i.e., desalination, external sources), and demand control (i.e., signals to farmers about po-78
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tential risk to encourage changes in irrigation technologies or crop composition). Garrido and79
Gómez-Ramos (2009) provide a summary of economic instruments for drought management,80
while a more complete overview can be found in Lago et al. (2015). Gómez Gómez et al.81
(2018) point out the relevance of including institutional aspects in the economic analysis. In82
terms of specific instruments, Gómez-Ramos and Garrido (2004) discuss the potential of op-83
tion contracts for efficient sharing of hydrological risks, whereas Vedenov and Barnett (2004)84
present weather derivatives as risk-management instruments for crop production. Meanwhile,85
water markets are an example of an instrument that increases water-use efficiency but also86
has risk-reduction potential, as shown in the work by Calatrava and Garrido (2005) and Zuo87
et al. (2015), both of which include estimates for downside risk.88
Specifically for water reservoir management decisions, Howitt et al. (2005) find that a89
recursive-utility specification with risk aversion provided the best fit for the data on actual90
storage levels in a Californian reservoir. Tu et al. (2003), on the other hand, propose hedging91
rules that can be used during drought periods to improve the water allocation process. An92
application to water management can be found in Hanemann et al. (2016), which simulates93
the downside risk of climate change impacts in California. In our paper, we consider the94
changes in crop composition, motivated by the Turkish data, and examine to what extent95
accounting for the downside risk in the optimal water management problem affects results.96
Our empirical results are threefold. First, we find that tighter environmental regulations97
do not necessarily have a negative impact on irrigation use, while the total supply and98
savings are affected positively. In our simulations, we observe that supply initially increases99
via higher savings, but flattens later once a certain level is maintained. Second, incorporating100
the LPM into the decision making process decreases the average agricultural profits, while101
lowering the variance as expected. Therefore, a severe shortage becomes less likely. Finally,102
we quantify how environmental constraints impact shortfall probability, expected shortfall,103
and semivariance. We find that tighter constraints slightly raise the shortfall probability and104
decrease the expected shortfall and semivariance.105
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2 Risk Measures and Attitudes106
The production of adequate research on water-use choices under uncertainty requires the107
consideration of two distinct, if interrelated, aspects: the discussion (modeling) of different108
attitudes to risk (or, more generally, to uncertainty), and the definition of relevant risk109
measures.2110
To evaluate the significance of randomness for actual choices, decision makers’ attitudes111
towards uncertainty need to be understood. Typically, models in economic literature use112
expected utility theory, in spite of widespread criticism on many of its assumptions. Within113
the expected utility framework, attitudes toward risk can be characterized by the curvature114
of utility (risk aversion) and of marginal utility (downside risk aversion), as discussed in115
Menezes et al. (1980). Alternatively, downside risk aversion can be modeled through a utility116
function which penalizes results below the mean or some another reference point (Fishburn,117
1977). The latter formalization can be related to the general phenomenon of loss aversion118
identified by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992), even if it is still based on a framework of119
additive probabilities.120
Meanwhile, risk measurement ranges from the simple calculation of variance (or standard121
deviation) to the analysis of stochastic dominance among distributions. Variance (signalling122
the dispersion of possible values around the mean) and the coefficient of variation (indicating123
the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) are two simple ways to measure risk.124
However, both variance and the coefficient of variation place equal weights on observations125
on either side of the mean, so they may not be ideal measures if there is a concern for126
bad outcomes. If these are concentrated in the lower tail of a distribution, as is the case127
with water scarcity, the analysis calls for risk measures that focus on the downside risk,128
such as skewness, semi-variance, or other lower partial moments. When this downside risk129
is important, that is, when the placement of risk in a distribution matters, one possibly130
2There are several ways to distinguish between risk and uncertainty, but the most common is to assume
“risk” refers to a situation where probabilities are known and “uncertainty” to when they are not (Knight,
1921). In the paper we assume known probabilities and use risk and uncertainty interchangeably.
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useful measure is skewness, which is the third standardized moment of a distribution. In131
particular, increases in skewness indicate that the probability mass is shifting to the left, so132
that downside risk is increasing. Nonetheless, it is still not a sufficiently general measure,133
since all moments of a distribution can matter.134
An alternative approach is to measure downside risk by calculating LPMs. These are one-135
sided measures that look only at outcomes below a reference target value, Q. The general136
expression for an LPM can be written as in Fishburn (1977):137
LPM (κ2, Q) =
∫ Q
−∞
(Q− q)κ2 dF (q) (1)
where κ2 ≥ 0 is the order of the partial moment and also reflects risk preferences in the138
below-target area, with κ2 < 1 signifying risk-seeking attitudes, κ2 = 1 representing risk139
neutrality (note that Eq.(1) becomes the expected value of the below-target outcome in this140
case) and κ2 > 1 indicating risk aversion. The extreme case of κ2 =∞ implies that only the141
worst possible outcomes are considered. The most popular LPM are the target semi-variance142
and its special case, the mean semi-variance (κ2 = 2 in both cases, but the target is specified143
as the mean in the latter).144
Fishburn shows that there is a utility function whose maximization is congruent with145
LPM measures. It is an asymmetric function, as follows:146
U(Q) =

Q, Q ≥ Q,
Q− κ1 (Q−Q)κ2 , Q < Q.
(2)
where κ1 is a positive scaling term. Of all possible LPM measures, only target semi-variance147
is compatible with the formulation of Menezes et al. (1980), which establishes that downside148
risk increases unambiguously if a spread-contraction combination transfers risk to the left149
side of a distribution while preserving mean and variance. Nevertheless, LPM are very150
intuitive: in fact, Unser (2000) provides an experimental study which shows that, in a151
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financial context, LPM are better at describing risk perceptions than variance. However,152
the author also stresses the importance of framing effects and of the simple probability of a153
below-target return (κ2 = 0).154
Finally, it is worth noting that another financial risk measure that would be easy to155
interpret even for complex portfolios is value-at-risk, which is a threshold value in monetary156
units such that the probability mass of getting losses greater than the threshold over a157
given (short) period is some specified number (typically 1% or 5%). Thus, if value-at-risk158
increases at a given confidence level, the expected potential losses for the period are growing,159
and therefore there is more risk. Since it only looks at losses, value-at-risk clearly belongs160
in the family of downside risk measures. However, as it only considers one specific quantile,161
it is not appropriate for ranking distributions.3162
3 Reservoir Management Model163
In this section we present the model that will be used to assess different assignation164
rules between agriculture and environmental requirements in a surface water reservoir. We165
consider a benevolent agent to manage the water supply, such as a water user association166
(WUA) or a local government body, and refer to this as the reservoir manager.167
While water levels in a reservoir are measured at regular intervals, future levels are168
random from the point of view of the reservoir manager, since they depend on run-off, which169
determines reservoir filling. In the Mediterranean region water levels are highly seasonal.170
Precipitation occurs mostly in winter and early spring, and is almost nonexistent during171
the summer and early fall. Precipitation increases the water supply for all user groups172
(via inflows to the reservoir) and it could partially (sometimes fully) offset the demand for173
irrigation. However, the irrigation season usually starts in late spring and continues until174
autumn, so it does not coincide with the main filling period in a typical hydrological year,175
3A broader view of risk is embedded in the concept of stochastic dominance, surveyed in Levy (1992).
This includes stochastic-dominance results based on the quantile approach.
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defined from October until September of the following year. Given the characteristics of the176
region, we assume in the model that precipitation is not available when irrigation is needed;177
we will demonstrate these features of the data in Appendix Section A.4178
3.1 Agricultural Profits179
Models of reservoir management for agriculture commonly assume that profits vary with180




pc αc Lc min(Qc/γc, 1) (3)
where the agricultural profits Π(Q) include the profits from every crop c. These in turn182
depend on the crop price pc, land productivity αc, crop water requirement γc, land allocated183
Lc, and the amount of water allocated Qc.5184
Different from the above formulation, we wish to exploit the possibility that farmers have185
downside-risk aversion so there is a disutility term when the irrigation water falls below a186
certain threshold. As a result, similar to (2), the utility from profits equals:187
Π̃(Q,Q) =





]κ2 , Q < Q (4)
where Q represents the threshold level, κ1 is some positive scaling term, and κ2 controls the188
risk preferences below the threshold area.189
It is noteworthy that the limits in (4) are defined in terms of quantity (i.e., the amount190
of irrigation Q) instead of profits (i.e., Π(Q)), assuming that the profits are non-decreasing191
4While we make this assumption to better fit the data, we could further revise the model to allow for this
substitution in other datasets/regions where such a link exists.
5Water prices are not included in the model, because the solution to the reservoir manager’s optimization
problem defines the quantity of irrigation water. It would be possible to calculate implicit shadow values
to be used as prices, instead of directly regulating quantity, if the regulatory framework called for a price
strategy. Additionally, we model the farmer’s land allocation decision as a discrete choice problem here but
we will focus on the implications of the model on water management decisions for brevity.
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in quantity. Consequently, the utility functional form is congruent with the lower-partial-192
moments (LPM), where the profits increase linearly in Q if the irrigation use is above the193
threshold, but they incur a penalty if available water is below the threshold.194
3.2 Environmental Constraints195
Environmental constraints to reservoir levels most often exist as a way to maintain ade-196
quate flows in river ecosystems. The establishment of a flow regime is complex and context-197
specific. There is not a single best way of doing it, although dams clearly play a significant198
role; see Dyson et al. (2003).199
We adopt the term E(S) to represent the environmental constraints, which may depend200
on the currently available water supply. We consider absolute and relative stock restric-201
tions to examine the effects of different environmental requirements. With the absolute202
restrictions, there is a fixed threshold of carryover stock: any volume above it can be used203
for consumption (or simply released to avoid overflows). With the relative restrictions, the204
reservoir manager splits water reserves, allotting a proportion of available volume to envi-205
ronmental uses as water levels increase. Either way, we assume that the stock that is carried206
over will be available in future periods to be released as environmental flows, if necessary.6207
3.3 Water Management Problem208
We first introduce some notation about the key components of the model. Water supply209
available in period (year) t is denoted by St, which is a function of the carryover stock from210
last period (wt), and stochastic recharge (Rt). This supply is allocated to four uses. Urban211
water use (Ut) is not expected to vary significantly with hydrological conditions, thus we212
treat it as constant throughout the paper (Ut = U). The second component (Ft) is the213
6While we model the time period as a year in this paper, one could alternatively consider monthly varia-
tions in stochastic variables and their effects on the amount of monthly irrigation and savings. Furthermore,
a monthly analysis with detailed data could provide more insight by allowing the environmental flows to
change throughout the year.
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amount of water released to avoid overflows, which is only relevant during periods with high214
inflows (when no irrigation is happening anyway) and has no economic return (except for215
avoiding damages). We model Ft as a function of the stochastic recharge. The third use is216
for irrigation (Qt), which is one of the control variables in our model. The last component217
is the carryover stock (wt+1), which provides the dynamic link between periods.218
Our timeline is as follows: at the beginning of the irrigation season, the reservoir manager219
observes the carryover stock and the recharge, to calculate the water supply. Taking into220
account urban water use and existing environmental constraints, the manager chooses the221
value for irrigation water (Q) to let farmers know how much water will be available to them222
in the coming months. The farmers then make crop choices that match their aggregate223
demand for irrigation to the amount declared by the reservoir manager. Depending on how224
much water is available, some percent of the land may be left fallow. The remaining supply225
is saved as carryover stock for the next period.226
The reservoir manager aims to maximize the expected discounted utility of profits from227









Resource Constraint: St = S(wt, Rt) = U + Ft(Rt) +Qt + wt+1;∀t = 0, 1, . . . (6)
Environmental Constraint: wt+1 ≥ E(St);∀t = 0, 1, . . . (7)
Initial State: w0 is given. (8)
where the first constraint (6) governs the evolution of the water stock: The left-hand side of229
this equation is the total supply of water (S), which depends on savings from last period (w)230
and stochastic recharge (R), while the right-hand side reflects all uses (U , F , Q), including231
the carryover stock (w′). The second constraint (7) is due to environmental protection, which232
is imposed as a lower bound on carryover stock (wt+1).233
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Given the recursive nature of the problem, we can rewrite it as a Bellman equation:234
V (w,R) = max
w′,Q
Π̃(Q,Q) + β E
R′|R
[V (w′, R′)] (9)
S(w,R) = U + F (R) +Q+ w′ (10)
w′ ≥ E(S). (11)
where the value function V (w,R) depends on the two state variables (w,R), which denote235
the carryover stock and stochastic recharge. The expectation operator E
R′|R
(·) is due to the236
uncertainty in future recharge levels, which may follow a known Markovian distribution that237
is conditional on the current recharge (R).238
It is worth noting that the environmental constraint provides a lower bound on the239
carryover stock. In other words, in a situation where the savings appear to be less than the240
environmental constraints (i.e., w′ < E(S)), the reservoir manager prorates the irrigation241
water use until the constraint is met.7 The rationing of irrigation water implies that the242
agricultural profits decline accordingly.243
Before we move onto the numerical illustration, it may be useful to describe how the244
solution will depend on some of the key parameters. A higher recharge implies higher water245
supply, which allows the manager to increase savings (carryover stock) as well as irrigation.246
On the other hand, an increase in the penalty threshold might lead to higher irrigation and247
lower carryover stock. Finally, a tighter environmental constraint imposes a higher amount248
that must be saved. As a result, during drier periods, the manager is forced to save more249
for the future, cutting down irrigation.250
7This assumption, while not necessary for the solution, is motivated by the data. In case of a shortage,
irrigation use is most often pro-rated, while residential use is not affected as much in the data; see Figure 1.
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4 Numerical Illustration251
Since the dynamic problem given in (9)–(11) is stochastic, it is more practical to illustrate252
the solution numerically rather than seek an analytical solution. We use data from Turkey253
to calibrate the key parameters of the model. These values are provided in Table 1. We254
refer to the Appendix Section A for further details on the data description and parameter255
estimation.256
The State Waterworks are in charge of managing the reservoirs in Turkey. They determine257
how much water to allocate for urban (residential) and irrigation uses. Once the amounts258
are set, municipalities run urban water management while WUAs handle irrigation. To do259
so, they report how much water is available to all farmers at the beginning of the season260
and then record crop choices for the agricultural area. Finally, the WUAs then decide on261
the amount of water to be allocated for each crop and the corresponding irrigation price.262
It is worth noting that we do not entertain this decentralised structure in our model for263
two reasons. First, water prices are considered as fees to balance the budget, thus they do264
not reflect scarcity value and in the case of agriculture, they are per area pricing. Second,265
the municipalities and WUAs do not have much control over the amount of water allocated266
across various user groups.267
In case of shortage, the State Waterworks prioritizes urban water use. Therefore, it is268
relatively steady in the data (after controlling for the population increase). This implies that269
any possible cuts are in agricultural use, as illustrated in Figure 1. In most cases, the land270
allocated for wheat experiences the most severe cuts, since wheat (relative to cotton, sugar271
beet, and maize) has the lowest crop water requirement in the region. However, this strategy272
of prorating agriculture in each period does not take into account the dynamic nature of the273
problem or the downside risk.274
The dataset used in this analysis is from South-Southeastern Turkey, and reports the275
aggregate allocation of agricultural land (of about 20, 000ha) from 1984 to 2007 across four276
crops (including leaving the land fallow). The crop composition over time is illustrated in277
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Figure 2. According to this figure, there is a significant change in the crop composition278
over time in that: (1) The proportion of land allocated for cotton has reduced significantly279
(from as high as 90% to as low as 15%) over time, (2) Maize has emerged in late 1990s as a280
lucrative option for land allocation, (3) The proportion of land left fallow has increased in281
late 1990s and early 2000s (it peaked at more than 20% in 2001), mostly due to the severe282
water shortages experienced in the region.283
To estimate agricultural profits (3), we set up a Logit model, where a representative284
farmer takes into account the crop prices, water availability, and land productivities and285
makes the land allocation decision over these four crops (cotton, maize, sugarbeet, and286
wheat). Leaving some part of the land fallow is also an option (of last resort with no287
economic benefits), unless enough water is available for irrigating the whole area.288
The threshold levels (Q) are not considered in the data generating process. To investigate289
the effect of different thresholds on the variables of interest (i.e., irrigation use, total and290
carryover stocks), we try threshold levels so that, based on the crop choice decision by291
farmers in (3), the proportion of land left fallow equals {10%, 20%, 25%}. Consequently,292
the corresponding threshold levels are set to
{




As indicated in Table 1, reservoir capacity (w̄) is fixed at 173.173hm3 and the minimum295
historical carryover stock is constant at 5.65hm3. We assume, as discussed in Section 3,296
that the carryover stock is bounded below by an environmental constraint (w = E(S)).297
We consider four cases here: (EC1) E(S) is constant at 5.65hm3, (EC2) E(S) is constant at298
11.30hm3, (EC3) E(S) is proportional to total supply at 5%, and (EC4) E(S) is proportional299
to total supply at 10%. These environmental constraints provide alternative minimum levels300
for the carryover stock. The stricter the environmental constraint, the more conservative the301
reservoir manager, saving more water for the future while making less available for irrigation302
use.303
8We could consider alternative values for thresholds, but the values used in the analysis already yield
dramatic changes to land use decisions.
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Since we do not observe the downside risk preferences in the data, we set the parameters304
κ1 and κ2 to 20 and 2, respectively. The choice of the value for κ2 is to make the use of LPM305
consistent with the utility framework in (2). Having done so, we have tried various values of306
κ1 and adopted a value that would make the penalty severe enough for the effect of LPMs307
to arise in the numerical illustration.308
We define the Benchmark case (i.e., Q0 = 0) as one with simple risk neutrality (without a309
threshold). For each environmental constraint (EC1–EC4) and penalty threshold level (Q0–310
Q3), the reservoir manager optimally chooses the irrigation use (Q) to maximize the sum311
of the expected discounted agricultural profits, defined as a value function in (9), subject to312
resource and environmental constraints, given in (10) and (11). Given the state variables in313
carryover water stock, stochastic inflows, and stochastic crop prices, we use the grid-search314
method to compute the value function in MATLAB.315
Once we compute the value and policy functions, we perform a Monte-Carlo simulation,316
running the model 1000 times for 25 years. The choice of 25 years is not arbitrary; the317
variables of interest converges to their long run targets by this period. In our analysis,318
we focus on three key variables: total supply (S), carryover stock (w′), and irrigation water319
(Q). First, in Section 4.1, for each environmental constraint and threshold level, we calculate320
the mean of these variables in selected periods and compare the effect of the threshold level321
against a benchmark model, which has no penalty threshold (Q0 = 0). Then, we evaluate the322
cost of threshold levels and environmental constraints on the agricultural profits in Section323
4.2. Finally, in Section 4.3, we return our attention to LPM measures for irrigation use324
and calculate shortfall probability, expected shortfall, and semi-variance over time, across325
different penalty thresholds and environmental constraints.326
4.1 Monte-Carlo Simulations: Summary Statistics327
This section presents the results from the Monte-Carlo simulation of our reservoir model,328
specifically for the irrigation use (Q), total supply of water (S), and carryover stock (w′). To329
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understand how these three variables evolve over time, we simulate the stochastic recharge330
and crop prices, and employ the optimal policy rules to calculate the three variables in each331
period of the simulation. While a low value for the carryover stock (eg., w0 = EC1) would332
create a severe shortage at the beginning of the simulation and produce more dramatic333
results, we assume that the starting carryover stock in period 0 is set to the median in the334
data (w0 = 41.78), so the results are consistent with the values in the data. As mentioned335
above, we simulate the model for 25 periods so that we can find out the long run targets of336
these three variables.337
We compare our results across different environmental constraints and thresholds. To do338
so, with each of the four environmental constraints, we calculate the mean of the simulated339
variables (irrigation water, carryover stock, and total supply of water). The benchmark model340
refers to the case where there is no threshold imposed, so no penalty is applied to manager’s341
utility (i.e., Q0 = 0 in (4)). Table 2 presents the average values (across simulations) of the342
three variables in selected periods for each environmental constraint and threshold level.9343
We start our analysis with the effect of environmental constraints, which present a re-344
striction on the lower bound of savings, so the more restrictive an environmental constraint345
is, the lower the irrigation use is on average. While our results in Table 2 verify this finding,346
the decrease in irrigation use is not statistically significant across environmental constraints:347
the mean irrigation use is around 130hm3. However, time profiles will be different. The main348
effect of environmental constraints is on the total supply via the carryover stock (savings).349
The mean carryover stock increases overall when the environmental constraint is more re-350
strictive: in our case, the direction of increase is from constant values (EC1 and EC2) to351
percent values (EC3 and EC4). For instance, in the benchmark model, the total supply in-352
creases from 289hm3 with EC1 to 304hm3 with EC4, along with the carryover stock (63hm3353
to 78hm3).354
When we focus on the effects of increasing threshold value, again we find that the ir-355
9Other summary statistics are also calculated but not presented here for brevity.
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rigation use is not affected significantly. Meanwhile, the carryover stock and total supply356
decrease with the threshold value across all environmental constraints. For instance, with357
EC1, the average total supply increases from 257hm3 with Q3 to 262hm3 with Q2, 288hm3358
with Q1, and finally to 289hm3 with no threshold level. As the threshold value is relaxed,359
the manager can afford to supply agriculture with less irrigation, so more can be saved as360
carryover stock, increasing the water supply.361
Table 2 also provides insights about the evolution of these three variables over the periods.362
In general, we observe that, in the earlier periods (i.e, period 5), the reservoir manager363
aggressively saves more for the future (see the high carryover stock in period 5), while trying364
to stay close to the threshold. Over the periods, the reservoir manager accumulates enough365
stock (see periods 10–25), so carryover stock goes down and more water can be released for366
irrigation use.10367
To summarize, across the four types of environmental constraints with varying thresholds,368
we can conclude that changing the environmental constraint to a more conservative one369
unambiguously increases the total supply, but has little effect on irrigation use. Also, the370
increase in threshold level mainly drives up the total supply via carryover stock. For instance,371
from a high threshold (Q3) to no threshold, the total supply increases by around 12% (from372
257hm3 to 289hm3 with EC1). Finally, the carryover stock is higher in earlier periods,373
signaling an initial increase in total supply, and then it levels off (often by period 10–15).374
Given that we start with the median value for the carryover stock in period 0, the variables375
appear to have converged to their long run target distribution by period 25.376
10In the benchmark case with no threshold and the case with low threshold (Q̄ = 109), the manager
appears to be overaggressive in saving the carryover stock for the future periods. This result is due to two
factors. On the one hand, the initial condition is lower than the long run value, which leads to a build up of
carryover stock, particularly to avoid the adverse effects of potential low inflows in the future. The second
factor is the bimodal feature of the distribution of the total supply, which leads to either very low or high
values for carryover stock. This behaviour disappears after the first few periods in these two cases and is
not at all present for the other two, with higher threshold levels.
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4.2 Monte-Carlo Simulations: Agricultural Profits377
In Table 3, we analyze the implications of the environmental constraints and threshold378
levels on the sum of expected discounted agricultural profits (which we will refer to as total379
profits). It is important to note that the values do not take into account the penalty term.380
The agricultural profits are highest in the benchmark model (4.11TRY (Turkish lira in real381
terms) with EC1), compared to threshold levels (e.g. 2.66TRY inQ2 and 2.22TRY inQ3), but382
often at the cost of higher variation.11 The main reason for this result is that the benchmark383
model includes no threshold, so it maximizes the agricultural profits (not the profits minus384
the penalty). However, the manager is also more prone to shortages in the benchmark385
model. To reduce the frequency and severity of these shortages, the reservoir manager can386
utilize the threshold levels (Q1–Q3), but at the cost of lower averages. Consequently, we can387
attribute the changes in the agricultural profits as the cost of thresholds. For instance, from388
the benchmark model to Q2, the average agricultural profits decrease by about 35% for all389
environmental constraints, while it further goes down by 16% from Q2 to Q3. Meanwhile,390
having a higher threshold level decreases the shortfall probability and variance below the391
threshold (which will be discussed in Section 4.3).392
The stricter environmental constraints decrease the total profits : relative to EC1, EC2393
decreases the total profits by 1.26–1.86%, whereas EC4 reduces by at least 6.8% for all but394
Q3. The effects of environmental constraints is less pronounced in Q3, since the threshold395
(Q3) is already at a high level (and so the variation is already reduced considerably).396
4.3 Monte-Carlo Simulations: Lower Partial Moments397
While the average irrigation use seems to be fairly stable across different environmental398
constraints and thresholds over time (see Table 2), it would be misleading to conclude that399
these factors have no effects at all on irrigation. Therefore, we calculate the lower partial mo-400
ments of the irrigation use, and assume that parameter κ2 equals {0, 1, 2} in (1). These three401
114TRY is roughly equal to 1USD.
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cases corresponds to shortfall probability, expected shortfall, and semi-variance, respectively.402
The shortfall probability is the probability of irrigation use going below the threshold,403
while the expected shortfall is the average difference between the threshold and irrigation404
use, conditional on the irrigation use being lower than the threshold, implying the magnitude405
of the shortages when they occur. The semi-variance, similar to the variance measure, signals406
the variation in the shortages when they occur. For instance, according to Table 4, with407
Q1 and EC1, the average shortfall probability over all periods is 0.68 indicating that in 68408
percent of the time, the amount of water given to farmers will be less than the threshold level409
of 109hm3. In this case, the irrigation use is on average 20.53hm3 less than this threshold,410
with semi-variance equal to 1229hm3 (semi-variance).411
Table 4 lists these three measures for the irrigation use across different environmental412
constraints and thresholds for selected periods. When the threshold is high (i.e. Q2 or413
Q3), it is expected that the shortfall probability will be high. In fact, with Q3, it is almost414
impossible for the manager to irrigate at or above the threshold in any period. As the415
threshold decreases (from Q3 to Q1), the average shortfall probability over all periods goes416
down: with EC1, it is 67% with Q2, and 34% with Q3.417
When we consider different environmental constraints, we see that the average shortfall418
probability decreases in earlier periods, but increases eventually, but mostly stays the same419
overall (i.e., from 67% with Q2 and EC1 to 71% with EC4). 12420
To explore the effect of the threshold level on the expected shortfall (κ2 = 1), we first421
revisit our definition of the expected shortfall given in (1):422
LPM (κ2 = 1, Q) =
∫ Q
−∞
(Q− q) dF (q,Q) (12)
where F (q,Q) denotes the cumulative distribution function of irrigation use q, which has423
12The average shortfall probability with Q2 in EC1 is 67%, whereas the four periods depicted in this table
have all higher probabilities. It is worth noting that in the earlier periods, the shortfall probability is much
lower (not illustrated here), which leads to this average value. The opposite is true for EC4, where, in the
earlier periods, the shortfall probability is higher, so the mean is higher than the four periods depicted on
Table 4.
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a probability density function denoted by f(q,Q). Equation (12) is slightly different than424
(1). In (1), the cumulative distribution does not depend on the threshold, so increasing the425
threshold cannot decrease the expected shortfall. Meanwhile, in (12), the cumulative distri-426
bution F (q,Q) also depends on the threshold level, given the dynamic nature of the problem,427
as the optimal rule for carryover stock changes with the threshold. Consequently, this fur-428
ther impacts the distribution of the irrigation use. To investigate the effect of the threshold429
on the expected shortfall, we compute the partial derivative of the expected shortfall with430
respect to threshold level:431



















Equation (13) implies two effects of the threshold on the expected shortfall. On the432
one hand, the higher the threshold, the more likely the irrigation use is to stay below the433
threshold, so the expected shortfall increases. This effect is due to the first term on the434
right hand side and also present in (1). On the other hand, when the threshold is larger, the435
distribution also changes (via the first term on the right hand side), because the reservoir436
manager revises the optimal carryover stock, which further affects the total supply in the437
next period. Thus, it is not clear if the overall effect is positive or negative.438
As can be seen in Table 4, the shortfall probability is relatively high for thresholds Q2439
and Q3, so the first effect dominates the second. Consequently, the expected shortfall goes440
down when the threshold is lower (from Q3 to Q2). Meanwhile, the shortfall probability is441
relatively low for threshold (Q1). In this case, the expected shortfall stays high compared to442
the threshold Q2, indicating that while irrigation use is less likely to fall below the thresholds,443
the difference is high when it occurs.444
The effect of environmental constraints on the expected shortfall is not as pronounced.445
While the environmental constraints do not appear to change the expected shortfall signif-446
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icantly in the case of Q3, the stricter constraints tend to lower the expected shortfall with447
lower thresholds. This pattern is similar but more significant for semivariance.448
To summarize, we find that the shortfall probability increases with the threshold level,449
while environmental constraints do not have a significant effect overall. Meanwhile, we450
distinguish the two effects of the threshold level on the expected shortfall: the first one is451
the direct effect and the second one is via the change in the policy rule. We conclude that452
an increase in the threshold level initially decreases the expected shortfall (since the second453
effect dominates), but eventually increases it (via the first effect). A similar pattern is also454
observed in the semi variance values. Meanwhile, tighter environmental constraints generally455
decrease the expected shortfall and semivariance.456
5 Concluding remarks457
This paper sets out to analyze the risk profiles of different assignment rules and envi-458
ronmental constraints in a water reservoir that serves agricultural demand for irrigation.459
We present a model for a downside risk-averse reservoir manager in order to examine how460
the optimal savings and irrigation use react to different assignment rules and increasingly461
demanding environmental constraints. To conduct our analysis, we incorporate the lower462
partial moments into our dynamic model, as they put more emphasis on the shortages. Since463
these are a key issue in water management in many irrigated areas, we believe the use of464
one-sided risk measures should be more widespread. Using Turkish data, we solve our model465
computationally and simulate it to evaluate the effects on irrigation use, total supply, and466
carryover stock, as well as agricultural profits.467
The results are quite intuitive. First, we conclude that while thresholds (for LPM)468
and environmental constraints do not impact the average irrigation use, total supply and469
carryover stock are affected positively by stricter environmental constraints and negatively470
by increasing thresholds. As environmental constraints get stricter, carryover stock has to471
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be maintained at a higher level, which raises the total supply. On the other hand, increasing472
thresholds mean the utility penalty is stronger, so more water is allocated to irrigation.473
Second, agricultural profits decrease with higher thresholds and stricter environmental474
constraints. On the one hand, thresholds put more emphasis on avoiding shortages, so475
the variance may go down at the expense of lower average profits. Tighter environmental476
constraints, by forcing higher savings, decrease profits.477
Third, we find that as the threshold increases, the shortfall probability increases. Mean-478
while, for a given threshold, stricter environmental constraints slightly raises the shortfall479
probability. However, the effect of thresholds on the expected shortfall and semivariance is480
not clear, as the dynamic problem will take the threshold into account, so the distribution of481
the irrigation use changes with the assumed threshold level. Meanwhile, the environmental482
constraint have a negative impact on the expected shortfall, which is more pronounced in483
the semivariance.484
Extensions to this research could include modeling the distribution of stochastic recharge485
as a Markov process, or utilizing its empirical distribution. Additionally, the model could486
include multi-purpose reservoirs with hydropower production, as well as more realistic envi-487
ronmental flow regimes. Another interesting avenue for further research would be to compare488
the results of our single-goal optimization model to those of more realistic, and complex, hy-489
droeconomic models of water management where multiple attributes are considered (Rausser490
and Yassour, 1981; Delforce and Hardaker, 1985; Gómez-Limón and Riesgo, 2004; Chung491
and Lee, 2009). The advantage of this approach is that one goal is not paramount and de-492
cision weights take center stage. Participatory methods (Munda, 2008; Messner et al., 2006;493
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A Data Description617
Water data presented here are from the Kartalkaya dam, located in the Ceyhan basin618
in south-eastern Turkey. It provides water for irrigation and drinking purposes. The dam619
capacity is 173.173 hm3 and the total irrigation area that it serves is 22, 810ha (Pazarcik620
County). It also supplies tap water to the city of Gaziantep (population of 1.5 million).621
Data concerning the flows into the Kartalkaya dam are available from January 1984 to622
August 2007 (with a total of 284 observations), and the boxplot of the flows (in hm3) are623
depicted in Figure 3. Since precipitation is mostly during the winter, reservoirs are required624
to provide water for summer irrigation. The government releases water for three purposes:625
tap, irrigation, and to avoid reservoir overflows. Tap water use amounts to around 100 hm3626
annually; irrigation use is slightly higher, ranging between 130 − 150 hm3. Water released627
to avoid overflows does not have any other economic benefit.628
Agriculture in general may make use of precipitation as a substitute for irrigation. How-629
ever, we assume precipitation is not a viable source when irrigation is needed, which is often630
the case for semi-arid and arid regions. Therefore, Qt measures the amount of irrigation631
during a period (from October to September).632
Water released to avoid overflows is censored from below: it is zero if there is no threat633
of overflows; also, more water than the reservoir capacity may be released in any given year.634
Therefore, we estimate the water release for flood control, denoted by F , using the Tobit635
model and utilizing the annual recharge R as the predictor.636
To solve the dynamic problem, we assume that the exogenous stochastic shocks in this637
economy stem from two components: inflows to the reservoir and crop prices. We estimate638
the annual inflows with an auto-regressive process, but reject the test for autocorrelation.639
Therefore, we fit the inflows data with the Gamma distribution.13640
Among the crop prices, only the crop price of cotton has changed significantly over the641
13See Heidecke and Heckelei (2010); Leizarowitz and Tsur (2012) for the use of Gamma distribution to
estimate inflows.
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last two decades. Meanwhile, the crop prices of wheat, maize, and sugar beet have stayed642
almost constant during the time period. To incorporate these stochastic shocks, we assume643
a log-normal distribution for the crop price of cotton, estimate an AR(1) process, and derive644
the transition matrix using the algorithm described by Tauchen (1986).645
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Table 1: Parameter Values for the Empirical Illustration
Type Parameter Variable Value
Computational Carryover stock: grid points Nw 100
No of periods in each simulation NT 25
No of simulations M 1000
LPM Penalty scalar κ1 20
Order of partial moment κ2 2
Penalty thresholdsa (hm3) Q1–Q3 {109, 121, 152}
Uncertainty Stochastic recharge: no of grid points NR 8
Stochastic recharge: distribution (hm3) Gamma(5.6910, 69.2267)
Cotton price: no of grid points Np 2
Cotton price: distribution AR(1)
Economic Discount rate (%) rβ 1%
Minimum carryover stock (hm3) w 5.65
Maximum carryover stock (hm3) w̄ 173.173
Env. constraints: fixed (hm3) EC1–EC2 (5.65, 11.30)
Env. constraints: variable (% of supply) EC3–EC4 (5%, 10%)
Water Use Residential demand (hm3) U 95.32
Flood Prevention (hm3) F max (−220.91 + 0.9695 R, 0)
Note: (a) The threshold values for the irrigation water use are chosen so the proportion of land left fallow
equals {25%, 20%, 10%}, respectively.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics (Mean) of Key Variables (in hm3) in the Simulation
Irrigation Use - Mean Total Supply - Mean Carryover Stock - Mean
Period EC1a EC2 EC3 EC4 EC1 EC2 EC3 EC4 EC1 EC2 EC3 EC4
Benchmarkb
5 87.77 88.00 92.20 137.17 267.65 269.26 272.83 310.89 84.48 85.85 85.22 78.03
10 129.71 123.68 125.94 128.16 292.72 291.15 293.22 301.70 67.52 71.97 71.79 77.95
15 136.23 129.15 129.15 131.11 292.55 293.08 293.93 304.18 60.84 68.43 69.28 77.46
25 138.86 137.23 138.36 130.51 295.93 297.49 299.15 303.71 61.56 64.73 65.26 77.59
Overallc 130.72 130.58 130.55 129.96 288.87 292.99 294.28 303.69 62.66 66.90 68.22 78.12
Q1=109d
5 88.60 101.89 115.42 141.99 269.01 278.05 288.70 309.32 85.04 80.75 77.85 71.88
10 134.55 130.13 130.38 128.22 295.19 293.52 294.60 301.24 65.19 67.94 68.77 77.59
15 141.65 132.97 132.01 128.54 294.07 293.49 294.13 299.81 56.96 65.08 66.69 75.84
25 136.57 135.39 134.40 133.42 292.91 295.37 296.13 302.97 60.88 64.52 66.26 74.11
Overall 130.79 130.64 130.57 130.28 287.73 292.08 293.75 301.24 61.49 65.99 67.73 75.53
Q2=121
5 115.33 126.16 130.30 143.29 251.28 263.94 267.30 296.54 40.61 42.45 41.66 57.88
10 121.88 127.82 130.21 136.70 255.60 265.92 267.66 291.66 38.38 42.75 42.10 59.58
15 126.68 130.10 130.50 135.13 257.79 267.46 268.12 290.16 35.77 42.02 42.27 59.66
25 129.66 130.28 131.06 133.50 260.68 267.56 269.89 290.05 35.68 41.94 43.49 61.18
Overall 131.91 131.65 131.59 130.86 262.10 269.83 271.01 288.13 34.86 42.83 44.08 61.91
Q3=152
5 132.86 131.65 131.53 131.13 260.30 261.28 261.53 268.13 32.12 34.30 34.68 41.68
10 131.07 130.87 130.84 130.08 255.49 259.17 259.88 269.66 29.10 32.98 33.72 44.26
15 130.84 130.94 130.98 130.71 253.70 259.02 259.88 271.53 27.54 32.76 33.58 45.50
25 132.13 131.60 131.54 131.46 252.14 258.03 258.49 271.48 24.69 31.10 31.63 44.70
Overall 132.36 132.11 132.08 131.56 256.89 260.88 261.45 270.97 29.21 33.45 34.04 44.08
Note: (a) The notation “EC1–EC4” refer to the environmental constraints for the minimum carryover stock: (EC1) constant at
5.65hm3, (EC2) constant at 11.30hm3, (EC3) variable with 5% of the supply, (EC4) variable with 10% of the supply. (b) The
“Benchmark” model refers to the case where there is no penalty threshold. (c) The term “Overall” indicates the average over all
periods. (d) The notation “Q1–Q3” refer to the threshold levels of the irrigation use that lead to {25%, 20%, 10%} of the land left
fallow, respectively.
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Table 3: Average Discounted Lifetime Agricultural Profits (without Penalties)
Averagea Std. Dev. % change (rel. to EC1)
Period EC1b EC2 EC3 EC4 EC1 EC2 EC3 EC4 EC1 EC2 EC3 EC4
Benchmarkc 4.11 4.06 4.03 3.83 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.26 0 -1.26 -1.92 -6.8
Q1= 109d 4.11 4.03 3.97 3.62 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 0 -1.86 -3.43 -11.76
Q2= 121 2.66 2.62 2.58 2.43 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0 -1.7 -2.88 -8.74
Q3= 152 2.22 2.2 2.2 2.16 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0 -0.72 -0.92 -2.79
Note: (a) The term “Average” indicates the average, across simulations, of the sum of the discounted
lifetime agricultural profits, measured in real terms of the domestic currency. This measure does not
account for the penalty if fallen below threshold. (b) The notation “EC1–EC4” refer to the environmental
constraints for the minimum carryover stock: (EC1) constant at 5.65hm3, (EC2) constant at 11.30hm3,
(EC3) variable with 5% of the stock, (EC4) variable with 10% of the stock. (c) The “Benchmark” model
refers to the case where there is no penalty threshold. (d) The notation “Q1 – Q3” refer to the threshold
levels of the irrigation use that lead to {25%, 20%, 10%} of the land left fallow, respectively.
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Table 4: Lower Partial Moments for Irrigation Use in the Simulation
Shortfall Probability (κ2 = 0) Expected Shortfalla (κ2 = 1) Semivariance (κ2 = 2)
Period EC1b EC2 EC3 EC4 EC1 EC2 EC3 EC4 EC1 EC2 EC3 EC4
Q1=109c
5 0.68 0.58 0.49 0.30 40.74 33.87 26.60 12.35 2432 1998 1531 646
10 0.31 0.36 0.37 0.44 18.54 20.03 19.43 16.76 1096 1157 1104 835
15 0.26 0.33 0.35 0.43 15.24 18.86 18.90 17.10 908 1095 1081 877
25 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.39 17.79 17.94 17.87 14.67 1067 1054 1028 738
Overalld 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.42 20.51 20.01 19.42 15.90 1227 1168 1106 801
Q2=121
5 0.91 0.73 0.68 0.51 10.91 9.34 8.03 3.95 400 373 292 72
10 0.82 0.72 0.68 0.61 9.05 8.47 7.91 5.02 288 304 271 96
15 0.74 0.69 0.69 0.64 8.38 7.56 7.32 5.23 277 239 222 93
25 0.71 0.69 0.68 0.66 6.97 7.13 7.03 5.51 192 212 211 99
Overall 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.71 6.84 6.75 6.51 5.86 197 188 163 101
Q3=152
5 1.00e 1.00 1.00 1.00 19.12 20.32 20.45 20.85 1071 1206 1210 1186
10 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 20.90 21.11 21.14 21.89 1223 1236 1237 1297
15 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 21.13 21.04 21.00 21.26 1238 1219 1209 1232
25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 19.85 20.38 20.44 20.51 1064 1134 1136 1137
Overall 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 19.61 19.87 19.89 20.41 1087 1110 1107 1140
Note: (a) Expected shortfall and semi-variance are measured in hm3 and squared hm3, respectively. (b) The notation
“EC1–EC4” refer to the environmental constraints for the minimum carryover stock: (EC1) constant at 5.65hm3,
(EC2) constant at 11.30hm3, (EC3) variable with 5% of the supply, (EC4) variable with 10% of the supply. (c) The
notation “Q1–Q3” refer to the threshold levels of the irrigation use that lead to {25%, 20%, 10%} of the land left
fallow, respectively. (d) The term “Average” indicates the average over all periods. (e) The probability value “1.00”
does not imply certainty, but is due to rounding of the results.
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Figure 1: Annual flows in Kartalkaya Dam (year starting in October)
Note: In this figure, we observe that the fluctuations in the water supply affects the
irrigation use more than the urban use. In fact, the urban use has steadily increased over
time, thanks to the population growth, while shortages limit farmers’ ability to access
enough water from the reservoir.
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Figure 2: Changes in crop composition for the period 1984–2007
Note: In this figure, more than 90% of the land was initially allocated for cotton. Over
time, this proportion has decreased considerably over time. Meanwhile, maize has emerged
in late 1990s as a lucrative option for land allocation, due to increasing yields in seed
quality and corn prices. Finally, the proportion of land left fallow has increased in late
1990s and early 2000s (it peaked at more than 20% in 2001), mostly due to the severe































































Figure 3: Boxplot of the reservoir flows (in hm3)
Note: According to this figure, tap water use (on a monthly basis) has been steady (also
illustrated in Figure 1). Meanwhile, irrigation use is highly seasonal, and reach to its peak
levels during June and July, while inflows (and therefore release for flood control) drop to
almost zero during the irrigation season.
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Figure 4: Water released to avoid overflows (in hm3) versus total supply before release
Note: In this figure, the horizontal axis represents the total amount of water collected
during a period. Since the reservoir capacity (indicated by the vertical line) is around
173hm3, any amount exceeding this threshold is released to avoid overflows, as illustrated
on the vertical axis. This relationship suggests that the water release for flood control is
censored from below, so a Tobit model would be a relevant model to fit the data. It is also
worth noting that the total supply of water is the amount collected minus the release for
flood control and is the net stock that is available for consumption and savings.
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